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An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) occurred in Singapore in March 2003. To illustrate
the problems in diagnosing and containing SARS in the
hospital, we describe a case series and highlight changes
in triage and infection control practices that have resulted.
By implementing these changes, we have stopped the
nosocomial transmission of the virus.
A
n outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) was first recognized in Singapore on March
12, 2003. The index patient was hospitalized at Tan Tock
Seng Hospital, which has since become the country’s des-
ignated SARS hospital. The patient infected 20 other peo-
ple (including patients and healthcare workers), who sub-
sequently became the sources for secondary spread of the
infection (1). As of June 12, 2003, a total of 206 cases and
31 deaths attributed to SARS had been reported in
Singapore. 
We describe the important lessons learned during the
triage and containment of SARS at the National University
Hospital, Singapore. Both involved expanding isolation
criteria to include all patients with undifferentiated fever
(even in the absence of respiratory symptoms or chest x-
ray changes), improving contact-tracing methods, enforc-
ing the use of fit-tested personal protective equipment in
all patient-care areas, avoiding aerosol-generating proce-
dures, and carefully monitoring all healthcare workers for
fever or respiratory symptoms. We also highlight the
impact of these measures on preventing the entry and
nosocomial spread of infection. 
The Study
From March 13 to May 5, 2003, we identified all epi-
demiologically linked patients whose disease met the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s case defini-
tion of SARS issued on April 29, 2003 (2). Initial investi-
gations included a complete blood count (with a differen-
tial count), serum biochemical measurements (including
electrolytes, renal and liver function values, creatine
kinase, and lactate dehydrogenase), and a chest x-ray.
Since the cause of the virus was not known at the onset of
the outbreak, routine microbiologic cultures of sputum,
urine, and blood were done to rule out common bacterial
causes of pneumonia. In addition, mycoplasma serology
and urine Legionella antigen testing were carried out.
When reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) kits for coronavirus detection became available,
later patients also provided samples for RT-PCR. 
Probable SARS was diagnosed in 14 patients and
healthcare workers at National University Hospital. The
median age of the patients (five men and nine women) was
58 years (range 21–84). Detailed patient characteristics,
including background, medical histories, symptoms, and
signs, are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Case Histories
Case 2
A woman 43 years of age was admitted to the hospital
on March 23; she had had fever, headache, vomiting, and
coughing for 7 days and diarrhea on the first day of her ill-
ness, which spontaneously resolved. She reported no
SARS contacts. The patient was admitted to an isolation
room with the diagnosis of community-acquired pneumo-
nia, but her condition rapidly deteriorated. She was trans-
ferred to the intensive care unit (ICU), where she died on
March 31. On day 3 of her hospital stay, healthcare work-
ers discovered that she had previously visited a friend with
hepatitis at the Tan Tock Seng Hospital. Two unidentified
SARS patients had been on that hospital ward. 
Case 3
Case-patient 3 was an ICU physician who performed a
bronchoscopy on case-patient 2 on March 26. This proce-
dure was performed in a negative-pressure room with
gloves, gown, and an N95 mask. He became ill with fever,
headache, and myalgia on March 29. His initial chest x-ray
was clear, and his fever resolved transiently for 30 hours
before recurring. Subsequent chest x-rays showed right
lower-lobe infiltrates that went on to involve both lung
fields. He eventually required intubation and ventilatory
support in the ICU. He was successfully extubated and has
since been discharged.
Case 6
Aman 63 years of age with coronary artery disease was
admitted to the hospital on April 8 after he reported dizzi-
ness and shortness of breath. He had seen his general prac-
titioner 2 days earlier with complaints of rhinorrhea, cough,
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*National University Hospital, Singapore; and †Tan Tock Seng
Hospital, Singaporeand myalgia. He had a documented temperature of 37.7°C
at the physician’s office. On admission he was afebrile, and
his chest x-ray showed cardiomegaly with bilateral lung
infiltrates. He was admitted to the general medical ward
with probable congestive heart failure. However, a
transthoracic echocardiogram showed a normal ejection
fraction. Within 12 hours, he became critically ill and was
transferred to the ICU, where he was intubated. His repeat
chest x-ray showed worsening bilateral infiltrates consis-
tent with acute respiratory distress syndrome. The patient
had visited an ill brother at the Singapore General Hospital
(hitherto a SARS-free hospital). The brother had previous-
ly been in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, on March 9–31, and
was subsequently identified as the index case-patient for
the outbreak at the Singapore General Hospital (3). Case-
patient 6 went on to infect 15 other people. 
Case 11
Case-patient 11 was the on-call physician who assessed
case-patient 6 and transferred him to the ICU. She had
worn a gown, gloves, and N95 mask, despite no require-
ment to do so on the general ward at that time. She had
fever, headache, and myalgia 3 days later. Her chest x-ray
on admission was clear. Respiratory and chest x-ray
changes occurred on day 5 of illness; the patient was dis-
charged after 12 days.
Course of Illness
Most of the patients had a prodrome of fevers and myal-
gias with no respiratory or chest x-ray changes until sever-
al days later. Their illnesses ran a steady course, lasting a
median of 11 days. In case-patient 3, the illness exhibited a
biphasic pattern with a brief resolution of fever, followed
by the return of high temperature and progression of respi-
ratory and chest x-ray changes. A subset of these patients
had a fulminant course with rapidly progressing respirato-
ry failure requiring intubation and mechanical ventilation.  
Hematologic and Biochemical Findings
The hematologic and biochemical findings of the case-
patients on admission are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
Leukocyte count was normal in nine case-patients. Mild
leukopenia was observed in one case-patient, and leukocy-
tosis was observed in another. Lymphopenia (defined as
<1.50 X 10-9/L) was observed in all patients. We found
mild thrombocytopenia in two case-patients. The lactate
dehydrogenase levels were elevated in eight case-patients.
The C-reactive protein was elevated in 7 of 11 case-
patients, and the procalcitonin was raised in four of five
case-patients.
Radiologic Changes
We saw a variety of chest x-ray changes in these
patients (Tables 3 and 4). The primary abnormalities were
Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 10, October 2003 1295
DISPATCHES
Table 1. Admitting clinical characteristics of patients 1 through 7 with severe acute respiratory syndrome  
Patient 
Characteristic  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Sex  F  F  M  F  F  M  M 
Age  71  43  40  78  53  63  84 
Source of virus  Community  Community  HCW  Community  Community  Community  Inpatient 
Admission diagnosis  Meningitis  Pneumonia  Suspect 
SARS 
Interstitial lung 
disease 
Pneumonia  Congestive 
heart failure 
Pneumonia 
SARS contact 
Co-illnesses  IHD; DM; 
hypothyroidism 
Hypertension    IHD, ypertension; 
chronic renal failure; 
CTD on steroids 
  IHD 
Hypertension 
IHD 
Cerebrovascular 
disease 
Symptoms               
Cough  -  +  +  -  +  +  - 
Dyspnea  -  +  -  +  +  -  + 
Rhinorrhea  -  -  -  -  -  +  - 
Sore throat  -  +  -  -  -  -  - 
Headache  -  +  +  -  -  -  - 
Myalgia  -  -  +  -  -  +  - 
Fever  +  +  +  -  +  +  + 
Others  Confusion  Vomiting, 
diarrhea 
      Dizziness   
Temp on admission (°C)  38.7  38.9  36.8  36.0  39.6  35.1  38.0 
Physical signs               
Crackles  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Chest x-ray findings  Right basal 
infiltrates 
Bibasilar 
infiltrates 
Right basal 
infiltrates 
Right basal infiltrates  Bilateral 
infiltrates 
Bilateral 
infiltrates 
Right upper lobe
infiltrates 
RT-PCR  ND  ND  Positive  ND  Positive  Positive  ND 
Outcome  Survived  Died  Survived  Died  Died  Died  Died 
aF, female; M, male; HCW, healthcare worker; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; IHD, ischemic heart disease; DM, diabetes mellitus; CTD, connective tissue 
disease; RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction; ND, not done. patchy unilateral or bilateral consolidation. Opacities were
predominantly in the lower lung zones in most patients.
Three patients had upper lobe infiltrates. However, five of
the patients were admitted to the hospital with normal
chest x-ray results. 
Conclusions
On March 18, 2003, our emergency department began
screening all febrile patients with respiratory complaints
for possible SARS (2). All suspected SARS patients were
admitted to a negative-pressure isolation room for moni-
toring. Probable SARS case-patients were transferred to
Tan Tock Seng Hospital for further management to keep
the hospital free of the SARS virus. 
The varied clinical signs and symptoms of SARS have
limited the success of such a triage system (4–8). We have
observed that current diagnostic guidelines may not be suf-
ficiently sensitive for assessing patients before admission
to hospital. For example, although a temperature of >38°C
is part of the diagnostic criteria (2), this symptom was
notably absent in two patients. The lack of a fever in case-
patient 4 may have been the result of long-term steroid use.
Case-patient 6 never had a documented temperature
>37.7°C and was hypothermic throughout his hospitaliza-
tion. In addition, a subset of patients may have fever and
myalgias without respiratory complaints or chest x-ray
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Table 2. Admitting clinical characteristics of patients 8 through 14 with severe acute respiratory syndrome  
Patient 
Characteristic  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Sex  M  F  M  F  F  F  F 
Age  63  74  72  28  24  28  21 
Source  Inpatient  Inpatient  Inpatient  HCW  HCW  HCW  HCW 
Admission diagnosis  Pneumonia; 
SARS 
contact 
Escherichia 
coli UTI; 
SARS contact 
Pneumonia. 
SARS contact 
Suspect  
SARS 
Suspect  
SARS 
Suspect  
SARS 
Suspect  
SARS 
Co-illnesses  IHD; DM; 
hypertension 
IHD; DM; 
hypertension; 
cerebrovascular 
disease 
Dilated 
cardiomyopathy; 
hypertension; 
chronic renal 
failure 
None  None  None  None 
Symptoms               
Cough  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Dyspnea  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Rhinorrhea  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Sore throat  -  -  -  -  +  -  - 
Headache  -  -  -  +  -  -  + 
Myalgia  -  -  -  +  +  +  + 
Fever  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Others               
Temp. on admission (°C)  38.5  38.0  38.5  38.2  38.0  38.5  38.8 
Physical signs               
Crackles  +  -  +  -  -  -  - 
Chest x-ray findings  Right basil 
infiltrates 
Bibasilar 
infiltrates 
Right basal 
infiltrates 
Right basal 
infiltrates 
Right basil 
infiltrates 
Right upper 
lobe infiltrates 
Left upper  
lobe infiltrates 
RT-PCR  ND  Positive  Positive  Positive  Positive  Positive  Positive 
Outcome  Survived  Died  Survived  Survived  Survived  Survived  Survived 
aM, male; F, female; HCW, healthcare worker; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; UTI, urinary tract infection; IHD, ischemic heart disease; DM, diabetes mellitus; 
RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction; temp., temperature; ND, not done. 
Table 3. Laboratory data for patients 1 through 7 admitted with severe acute respiratory syndrome  
Patient  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Hemoglobin (g/dL)  10.9  12.5  13.4  14.1  12.0  16.3  12.1 
Leukocyte count (X10
-9/L)  4.52  19.34  5.3  14.65  5.41  9.29  10.14 
Lymphocyte count (X10
-9/L)  0.78  0.94  0.71  1.02  0.53  0.63  0.21 
Platelet count (X10
-9/L)  117  149  189  180  176  136  82 
ALT (U/L)  55  37  23  22  76  35  210 
AST (U/L)  65  108  39  102  121  92  58 
CK  290  183  213  86  1,045  124  499 
LDH  747  2,513  518
b  1,032  2,248  2,015  955 
C-reactive protein  5.2  34.0  141.4  27.4  ND  ND  7.4 
Procalcitonin  0.14  1.45  ND  1.27  ND  15.21  ND 
aALT, alanine aminotransferase; AST, aspartate aminotransferase; CK, creatine kinase; LDH, lactate dehydrogenase; ND, not done; values in boldface are abnormal. 
bNormal value for LDH at this laboratory was <500. changes until later (cases 3 and 11). Booth et al., in a ret-
rospective analysis of 144 patients with SARS, reported
that 11% of patients had no respiratory symptoms and
would not meet current criteria for SARS, despite having
fever, contact history, and chest x-ray infiltrates (9). Rainer
et al., in a study of 515 patients attending a SARS screen-
ing clinic, found that current World Health Organization
guidelines, which emphasize respiratory tract symptoms,
had a low sensitivity of 26% (10). We expanded our isola-
tion criteria to include all patients with undifferentiated
febrile illness and chest x-ray infiltrates with or without
fever or respiratory symptoms until an alternative diagno-
sis is made, or until they defervesce and serial chest x-ray
findings are normal.
The nonspecific symptoms of this illness often require
establishing a history of contact with a SARS patient as a
critical clue to the diagnosis (2). However, a contact histo-
ry may not be forthcoming at the initial interview. In
Singapore, SARS is an imported infection in which the
epidemiology remains well defined with clear lines of sec-
ondary spread in the hospitals and community (3).
Emphasis is placed on using local epidemiologic clues to
elicit a history of visits or previous admissions to Tan Tock
Seng Hospital or other healthcare facilities and to inquire
whether any family members are ill or hospitalized.
Patients without a contact history are still isolated if the
clinical suspicion is high. A national computerized data-
base of SARS patients and their contacts has been estab-
lished to assist with this process. An epidemiology team is
also used to perform more exhaustive contact tracing and
liaisons with other healthcare facilities. This team also
monitors and investigates any clusters of pneumonias
within our hospital. Suspected case-patients are then
immediately transferred to the isolation area for further
investigation.
Our initial infection-control policy first required staff
working in the emergency department, ICU, and isolation
rooms to wear full personal protection equipment (PPE),
which included an N95 mask, disposable gloves, and long-
sleeve gowns. Virus transmission is likely due to droplet
infection, but fecal-oral transmission has also been report-
ed (11). The role of fomites has yet to be defined; prelimi-
nary data suggest that the virus can remain viable at room
temperature for at least 2 days. Recognizing that patients
with unsuspected cases of SARS could slip through our
triage system onto the general wards (see case 6), all hos-
pital staff with direct patient contact were required to wear
full PPE beginning April 8. In addition, all patients are
now examined with the use of dedicated equipment.
Despite the use of PPE, two of our physicians were
infected with the virus. The first physician performed an
invasive procedure (bronchoscopy) on case-patient 2. The
outlet port of the patient’s ventilator was later discovered
to have malfunctioned during the procedure, exposing the
physician to a large jet of exhaled air. Reports of protected
healthcare workers becoming infected during intubation of
SARS patients have also emerged from Canada (12). The
recommendations on the use of PPE are likely insufficient
for procedures that may promote aerosolization of respira-
tory secretions (13). Therefore, these procedures are now
performed in a negative-pressure room (with an anteroom)
using a positive air–purifying respirator suit. 
The second physician (case-patient 11) may have
become infected because the N95 mask was poorly fitting.
Alternatively, transmission may have occurred through the
conjunctival mucosa. All healthcare workers are now
required to use eye protection when examining patients.
Fit-testing of N95 masks is also mandatory, in addition to
training on the correct use and disposal of PPE. 
SARS has demonstrated remarkably efficient transmis-
sion in the hospital environment (76% of Singapore cases
were nosocomially acquired) (3). At our hospital, nosoco-
mial transmission occurred in nine persons. Our hospital
structure of open wards with large numbers of beds sepa-
rated by curtains may have been a contributory factor to
the spread of the virus. These wards are subdivided into
cubicles of four to eight beds and have open windows and
ceiling fans with no controlled airflow patterns. Another
likely factor was the failure to implement a policy of uni-
versal PPE use early in the outbreak. Where such measures
were implemented (i.e., isolation rooms), no nosocomial
transmission occurred.
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Table 4. Laboratory data for patients 8 through 14 admitted with severe acute respiratory syndrome  
Patient  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Hemoglobin (g/dL)  15.0  8.4  11.2  12.5  14.3  13.2  13.5 
Leukocyte count (X10
-9/L)  3.73  7.2  4.94  6.3  3.6  6.2  6.76 
Lymphocyte count (X10
-9/L)  0.83  1.34  1.04  0.30  0.84  1.13  0.97 
Platelet count (X10
-9/L)  121  163  167  231  176  184  240 
ALT (U/L)  51  31  20  10  15  19  8 
AST (U/L)  68  52  19  21  21  21  25 
CK  35  192  73  68  85  88  56 
LDH  685  1,034  390  280  275  319  696 
C-reactive protein  3.1  4.3  0.9  <0.7  <0.7  <0.7  <0.7 
Procalcitonin  ND  1.27  ND  ND  ND  ND  ND 
aALT, alanine aminotransferase; AST, aspartate aminotransferase; CK, creatine kinase; LDH, lactate dehydrogenase; ND, not done. In addition, because hospital staff are a recognized
source of secondary transmission (3,4,6), all healthcare
workers are now required to monitor their temperatures
three times a day. Anyone with a respiratory illness or a
temperature >37.5ºC is removed from duty, pending fur-
ther evaluation. This policy has successfully prevented the
secondary transmission of SARS from affected healthcare
workers. 
The lessons gathered from our hospital outbreak have
resulted in dramatic changes to our triage and infection-
control policies. All patients with undifferentiated febrile
illness, respiratory complaints, or chest x-ray infiltrates are
isolated, screened for SARS contacts, and nursed with full
PPE. Despite continued community transmission of SARS
in Singapore (the last community case was identified on
May 10, 2003), the measures implemented since April 8,
2003, enabled us to identify and contain eight additional
SARS cases and prevent the nosocomial transmission of
the virus. 
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and microbiology at the National University Hospital. His
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